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GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IN WISCONSIN
It is a firmly established principle of American jurisprudence
that the rule "respondeat superior" does not apply to the state,
a county, town or municipal corporation in the performance of a
governmental function; in other words, that any such body is not
liable for the negligence of its officers, agents or employes who
are engaged in the performance of a governmental function. On
this point the courts are practically unanimous. They are not
unanimous, however, on what constitutes a governmental function.
The purpose of this article is to examine and discuss the application of the above stated principle in Wisconsin.
I.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION IN WISCONSIN.
In Evans vs. Sheboyga.n, 153 Wis. 287, there is a review of
the Wisconsin cases on this point. Barnes, J., in the opinion on
pages 288 and 289:
"It has been held that a city is not liable for damages
for property destroyed by fire resulting from the negligence of the firemen employed, because they were performing a public or governmental duty. Hayes v. Osh-

kash, 33 Wis. 314; Britton v. Green Bay & Ft. H. W. W.
Co., 81 Wis. 48, 57, 51 N. W. 84. Nor for the negligence
of a fireman in hauling coal for use by the city fire department. Manske v. Milwaukee, 123 Wis. 172, ioi N. W.
377. Nor for injury to a person caused by the negligence
of a drunken fireman in driving a fire truck. Higgins v.
Superior, 134 Wis. 264, 114 N. W. 49 o . Nor for the action of a city treasurer in selling the property of the wrong
person to secure payment of delinquent personal property taxes. Waltace v. Menasha, 48 Wis. 79, 4 N. W. ioi;
Hurley v. Texas, 20 Wis. 634. Nor for injuries caused by
a board of public works in disposing of city garbage.
Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N. W. 1O3O. Nor
for the death of a child caused by the negligence of a
school board in permitting sewers to become clogged up.
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Folk v. Milwaukee, 1o8 Wis. 359, 362, 363, 84 N. W. 42o.
Nor for injuries resulting to a pedestrian from permitting
children to coast on the streets with bob-sleds. Schultz v.
Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254, 5 N. W. 342. Nor for issuing a
license to permit an exhibition of animals on the streets.
Little v. Madison, 49 Wis. 605, 6 N. W. 249. Nor for the
negligence of a health officer in performing the duties of
his office. Kempster v. Milwaukee, 103 Wis. 42-, 423, 79
N. W. 411. Nor for placing a manhole in a street in a
negligent manner. Ziegler v. West Bend, 102 Wis. 17,
78 N. W. 164. On the contrary, it has been held that a
city in constructing cisterns in which to store water for
fire purposes is performing a municipal function and is
liable for damages caused by the negligence of its employees. Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W.
565. And that in the opening of,-streets and the assessments of damages and benefits resulting therefrom and
in collecting the sums so assessed a city is performing a
corporate as distinguished from a public duty, and is liable
for the tort of an officer in seizing and selling property
to pay a void assessment. Durkee v. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 123,
17 N. W. 677. And the same rule is held where a city in
laying out or building a highway wrongfully invades the
property of an abutting owner. Bunker v. Hudson, 122
Wis. 43, 54, 99 N. W. 448; Nicolai v. Verona, 88 Wis.
551, 6o N. W. 999. Also that a city in furnishing water
to private consumers is performing a corporate function
and is liable for the negligence of its agents. Piper v.
Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 314, 122 N. W. 730."
Since the decision in Evans v. Sheboygan, supra, the Wisconsin court has held the following functions to be governmental:
Maintenance of streets. Bruhnke v. La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485.
Maintenance of fire and police alarm system. Engel v. Milwaukee, I58 Wis. 480. Maintenance of school playgrounds and apparatus thereof. Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 2o L. R.
A. (N. S.) 532. Maintenance of state fish hatchery. Apfelbacher
v. State, i6o Wis. 565. Conducting a state fair. Morrison v.
Fisher, 16o Wis. 621.
In the light of the foregoing decisions, let us try to discover
what is the criterion for a governmental function in Wisconsin.
167
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Several definitions are given and several elements stated as
requisite to this function. The decisions show, however, that all
of these functions are not requisite.
In Evans v. Sheboygan, supra, page 288, Barnes, J., states:
"The reason of the rule is that the duty of opening and
maintaining highways is enjoined on towns, cities, and
villages by law and for the benefit of the general public,
and that in the performance of these duties the municipalities are performing a governmental and not a municipal
function."
Two elements are here included: "A duty enjoined or required by law," and, "for the benefit of the general public." Obviously there are governmental functions, the performance of
which is not enjoined or required but is merely permitted by law.
For example, the maintenance of school playgrounds. Bernstein
v. Milwaukee, supra. The City of Milwaukee was authorized but
not required to maintain school playgrounds. The disposal of
garbage, Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, was also a permis-

sive and not a required act. A governmental function is, therefore, not necessarily one that is required by law to be performed.
The second element included in the foregoing statement of the
court, to-wit: "for the benefit of the general public" is almost
universally made a part of definitions of governmental functions.
It is usually contrasted with benefit to the public corporation in
its corporate capacity. Thus, in Folk v. Milwaukee, 1O8 Wis. 359,
Winslow, J., at page 363, statds:
"This court early adopted and has consistently maintained the rule that a municipal corporation is not liable
for injuries resulting from the acts or defaults of its officers where it is engaged in the performance of a merely
public service, from which it derives no benefit in its corporate capacity, but which it is bound to see performed
in pursuance of a duty imposed by law for the general
welfare of the inhabitants or of the community."
"Public welfare," and "welfare of the general public," are
very indefinite terms. Courts have been striving ever since their
inception to define these terms. Clearly the function need not be

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IN WISCONSIN

for the benefit of the inhabitants of the state as a whole. It may
be for the benefit of the community, yet not in the corporate capacity of the community. Maintenance of a fire department,
everywhere, except perhaps in Kansas, considered a governmental function, is generally local in its benefit in the sense that
it is limited to the particular city or village which maintains the
department. This is true also of garbage disposal. On the other
hand, certain functions which are not governmental, benefit the
public of the community. The furnishing of water to citizens is
a public benefit. Nothing is of greater public importance than to
have adequate water supply for the inhabitants of a city. While
it is necessary, therefore, that a function to be governmental must
be beneficial to the public, at least to the public in the community
affected, not all functions of such a nature are governmental.
Turning now to Wisconsin cases holding certain functions to
be private or corporate, we find further distinctions between the
two classes of functions;. In Piper v. Madison, 14o Wis. 311,
where it was held that a city in selling and distributing water to
its citizens is acting in its private or corporate capacity the court
cited with approval Judge Dillon's oft-quoted statement as follows:
"Municipal corporations * * * possess a double character: the one governmental, legislative, or public; the
other, in a sense, proprietary or private * * * In its governmental or public character the corporation is made,
by the state, one of its instruments, or the local depositary
of certain limited and prescribed political powers, to be
exercised for the public good on behalf of the state rather
than for itself * * * But in its proprietary or private character the theory is that the powers are supposed not to be
conferred, primarily or chiefly, from considerations connected with the government of the state at large, but for
the private advantage of the compact community which
is incorporated as a distinct legal personality or corporate
individual; and as to such powers, and to property acquired thereunder, and contracts made with reference
thereto, the corporation is to be regarded quocad hoc as a
private corporation, or at least not public in the sense that
the power of the legislature over it or the rights represented by it is omnipotent." 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. Sec. 66
169
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(39). Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314; Mulcairnsv. lanesville, 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565; Folk v. Milwaukee, io8
Wis. 359, 84 N. W. 42o.
On pages 314 and 315, Siebecker, J., in the opinion continues:
"The function of a city in selling and distributing
water to its citizens is of a private nature, voluntarily
assumed by it for the advantage of the people of the city.
Responsibility for the acts of persons representing it in
such a business falls upon the city through the relation of
master and servant, and the maxim of respondeat superior
applies. Whenever this relation is established the city is
liable in damages for the negligence of its agents and servants in the conduct of such business. The following
adjudications uphold this liability upon the ground that
the city in conducting such a business is acting in its
proprietary capacity:" (Citing cases).
Emphasis is here placed on the fact that the city is conducting
a business from which revenue is derived. Is then the fact that
revenue is derived from the performance of the function sufficient to take it out of the governmental class? In Morri on v.
Fisher, 16o Wis. 621, the court decided that the holding of the
Wisconsin state fair through the agency of the State Board of
Agriculture including, the giving of an aeroplane exhibition is a
governmental function although revenue was derived through
the medium of admission charges and concessions. The revenue
derived was devoted to reducing the appropriation made by the
state for conducting the fair. In Piper vz. Madison, supra, the
revenue derived was devoted to the maintenance of the waterworks. Obviously, therefore, the fact that revenue is derived
in the performance of a function is not sufficient to render it a
corporate function. If that were true, then whenever a city made
a charge for use of a park privilege or for the collection of garbage, the function would cease to be governmental.
In Durkee v. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 123, it was held that a city is
liable in an action of tort for the acts of its officers in seizing and
selling property to pay a void special assessment for benefits from
the opening of a street. The decision is based squarely on the
ground that the laying out and opening of streets in a city, the
assessment of damages and benefits resulting therefrom, and the
170
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collection of sums so assessed as benefits, are strictly municipal
functions as distinguished from public or governmental. There
is no discussion of the distinction between private and governmental functions. Taking this case together with Evans v. Sheboygan, 153 Wis. 287, we have the apparent contradiction that
the laying out and opening of streets is a private or municipal
function while the opening and maintenance of streets is a public
or governmental function, and the Durkee case is cited without
disapproval in the Evans case. There is, however, a real distinction between these cases and that is this: In the Durkee case the
city was not performing as toward the private property owner a
public function because he was in a different class from the
traveling public for whom the highway was being opened. The
acts of the officers amounted to trespass on private property.
This distinction is pointed out in a dictum in Folk v. Milwaukee,
io8 Wis. 359, where Winslow, J., in the opinion at page 364,
states:
"In none of these cases (referring to three Wisconsin
cases which later will be considered) were the city officers who were guilty of negligent or wrongful acts acting
in a governmental capacity toward the person injured."
This distinction is supported in Bunker v. Hudson, 122 Wis.
43. We have then another principle, to-wit: That a function
which is strictly governmental as toward the general public may
not be governmental toward private persons whose property
rights are invaded.
Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24, cited in Evans v. Sheboy-

gan, supra, is an anomalous case. Here it was held that the city
was liable for the negligence of workmen employed by the city
in constructing a cistern for the storage of water for fire department purposes, and the court based its decision on the ground
that the foreman who had supervision of the work was not a
public officer or agent of, the city but was specially employed for
that purpose. The fact remains, however, that this foreman was
an employee of the city and that the function was clearly governmental. Manske v. Milwaukee, 123 Wis. 172. The opinion carried to its logical conclusion would lead to absurd results,
results squarely opposed to the great weight of authority in Wisconsin. While the Mulcairns case has been cited without disap-
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proval in later cases and has not been expressly overruled, it
seems to be absolutely wrong, and if the question is again
squarely presented the case should be overruled.
To sum up on this first point, as to what is a governmental
function in Wisconsin, the careful examination of all the Wisconsin authorities forces us to the conclusion that we have not
yet evolved a clear-cut line or demarcation between governmental and municipal functions; that there is still a hazy borderland between the two; that the best we can say is that those functions which are performed under the police power for the benefit
of the public in the state or in the municipality from which the
municipality derives no benefit in its corporate capacity, whether
such functions are required or merely authorized by law, are governmental functions; that those functions performed by a municipality in the nature of quasi public business undertakings, from
which revenue is derived and which are similar to functions performed by public utility companies, are, at least insofar as service is rendered to private persons for a charge, private or municipal functions. This latter class should include the maintenance
of waterworks, electric light plants and distribution systems, gas
plants and street railways; but it should not include functions
which are strictly governmental such as the maintenance of parks
merely because some revenue may de derived therefrom.
II.
WHAT EXCEPTIONS ARE MADE IN WISCONSIN IN
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF NONLIABILITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS?
One such apparent exception is pointed out in the foregoing
discussion, that where private property rights are invaded the
rule of respondeat superior applies. However, as to the owners
of such rights, the function is not properly governmental. This
apparent exception has been made in the case of seizure of private property for illegal special assessment for opening a street.
Durkee v. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 123. In the case of unlawful diversion of surface water collected in city drains and cast upon private
land. Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518. Schroeder v. Baraboo,
93 Wis. 95. In the case of discharge of sewage effluent from the
city's septic tanks into a stream running through private prop172

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IN WISCONSIN
erty. Johns v. Platteville, 157 N. W. (Wis.) 761. These cases
are not, however, real exceptions to the rule because they proceed upon the ground that as to these private property owners
the function is not governmental.
One other exception is to be considered. In Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, Barnes, J., in the opinion at page 578,
after stating the rule of non-liability, says:
"The exception to this rule is that a municipality may
not maintain a public nuisance even where it is performing a governmental duty."
In support of this statement four cases are cited, each of
which we shall now consider.
Folk v. Milwaukee, 1O8 Wis. 359. In this case a pupil, attending one of the public schools in Milwaukee, contracted a
disease caused by a defective sewer pipe in the school house
which sewer pipe emitted gas and constituted a nuisance, and
it was expressly pleaded in the complaint that the sewer pipe was
a nuisance. It is obvious that this condition constituted the
clearest kind of a public nuisance and yet the court held that the
city was not liable. Winslow, J., at page 364 in the opinion
states:
"We do not lose sight of the fact that there is another
principle frequently approved by this court, namely, that
a municipal corporation may not construct or maintain a
nuisance in the street or upon its property to the damage
of another, or negligently turn water or sewage upon the
lands of another, without liability. Gilluly v. Madison, 63
Wis. 518; Hughes v. Fond du Lac, 73 Wis. 38o; Schroeder v. Baraboo, 93 Wis. 95. These cases all go upon the
principle that the city cannot in the management of its
corporate property create a nuisance injurious to the
property or rights of others. In none of these cases were
the city officers who were guilty of negligent or wrongful acts acting in a governmental capacity toward the person injured.. In the present case, however, there can be
no doubt that in the management of the school house the
city officials were acting in a purely governmental capacity, as far as their relations to the deceased child were

1 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

concerned. This consideration is, we think, controlling,
and results in affirmance of the ruling of the trial court."
The Folk case, therefore, instead of being an authority supporting the statement of Barnes, J., in the Bernstein case, is directly contra to it.
In Schroeder v. Baraboo, 93 Wis. 95, the second case cited
in support of Justice Barnes' statement, a drain had been constructed in part by the city to connect with a number of privy
vaults. After a number of years the outlet below the plaintiff's
property was walled up and the sewage catch basin was located
at the corner of plaintiff's lot to take care of surface water on
the street. At the time in question there was a severe rain storm
and the water from the surface above the plaintiff's property
flowed into the old drain which burst and flooded the plaintiff's
property. There is not a word in the opinion as to the performance of a governmental function. It is a clear case of trespass
to private property and therefore falls within the apparent exception stated in the Folk case and is no authority in support of
the statement for which it was cited.
In Hughes v. Fond du Lac, 73 Wis. 380, the third case cited
in support of Justice Barnes' statement, the plaintiff was driving
a horse in the evening on a public street and the horse became
frightened at a large wooden roller which had been left in the
street by city workmen. The statutory notice required to be
given under section 1339 was not given, but the action was sustained on the ground that the city was maintaining a nuisance,
and the court stated that the injury to the plaintiff was caused
not by nonfeasance or negligence on the part of the city, but by
malfeasance by the performance of an act which was wholly
wrongful. The court distinguishes between neglect to keep
streets in repair and active malfeasance in placing obstructions
in the same and decided the case on this ground. It is clear that
the only ground upon which this decision can be sustained is
that the city placed in this street something which was unlawful
in itself, not a proper or lawful thing to be in the street. Hence,
it is an authority merely that the city may be liable in the performance of a governmental function where it is doing a thing
which is wholly ur .wful, but not where the city is doing a lawful thing in a negligent or improper manner. If the statement
of Justice Barnes means that a nuisance can only result where
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the city is doing an act wholly unlawful, then the Hughes case
supports it. If, on the other hand, the word "nuisance" in this
statement has the common meaning, such that a nuisance may
result from negligence, then the Hughes case does not support it.
The fourth and last case stated in support of Justice Barnes'
statement is Gilluly vs. Madison, 63 Wis. 518. This case is very
similar to the case of Schroeder v. Baraboo and is explained exactly on the same grounds, to-wit: trespass on private property.
These are the only cases cited by the court in the Bernstein
case in support of this statement. We think it is, therefore, clear
that the dictum does not extend the principle farther than the
statement of that principle in Folk v. Milwaukee, supra, and that
a city would, therefore, not be liable for negligence of its servants in the performance of a governmental function although
such negligence might result in what is commonly termed a
"nuisance." There are a number of cases in Wisconsin which
decide clearly that where the city is performing a governmental
function, even though the situation created or the acts done
would amount to a nuisance, the city is not liable to those persons toward whom the function is governmental. Liermann v.
Milwaukee, 132 Wis: 628. Higgins v. Superior, 134 Wis. 264.
III.
DOES THE EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES APPLY
TO QUASI PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
OR ORGANIZATIONS?
In Sutter v. The Milwaukee Board of Fire Underwriters,i6o
N. W. (Wis.) 57, it was decided that the rule of non-liability
does not apply to a quasi public corporation or organization although such organization is gratuitously performing a function
which, if performed by a municipality, would be clearly governmental.
E. L. McINTYRE,
First Assistant City Attorney, Milwaukee.

